A dead king with no apparent heir often leaves a volatile and unpredictable court. Declan Galvin shows why the next “Big Man” in Ethiopia is not exactly easy to predict. Whoever takes power after the unexpected death of Meles Zenawi will however have to play the game – you need many henchmen to be the King!
It was reported that Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Meles Zenawi died on August 20th at the age of 57, a relatively young age for an African dictator. Zenawi had been the de facto leader of Ethiopia since the coup he led dislodging Mengistu Haile Mariam in 1991. Mariam had himself incidentally removed his predecessor, Haile Salassie, by coup in 1974. Zenawi certainly represents a quintessential ‘Big Man’ in contemporary Africa, particularly with reference to his polarizing disposition that allowed him to accumulate scores of staunch allies and intense enemies during his twenty-one year reign.
Zenawi is known for his repressive and intolerant leadership style that jailed dissident journalists, killed hundreds of opposition members and protesters, and forced numerous Ethiopians into exile. While his human rights record leaves much to be desired, Zenawi’s economic successes and policies are hard to ignore with realistic claims of 11% annual growth since 2004, a revived agricultural sector, and a (mostly) honest and well-intended use of donor funds. Ethiopia has also become one of the United States’ more reliable allies in Africa, allowing the U.S. to base its military and surveillance drones in the country as well as committing Ethiopian troops to peacekeeping missions – particularly in fighting Islamic extremism throughout the Horn region.
Zenawi, like many ‘Big Men’ rose to power through informal networks from outside the formal state structure. Zenawi, again like most African ‘Big Men,’ maintained control by pumping money, opportunity, jobs, and any kind of reward into these informal structures by pillaging the formal state, or through strict application of the military against the opposition. For their part, the informal networks and persons supported Zenawi so long as the wealth and opportunity flowed. However, with the death of Zenawi, the informal network, of which he was previously the head, is now shifting and someone must come to the fore to fill this void.
But informal networks are not linear; rather they are usually extremely complex, making the next ‘Big Man’ hard to predict. Mats Utas described informal networks in his book, African Conflicts and Informal Power, as “an intricate latticework of collaborative ventures…and consist of relations that are enduring but by no means permanent.” In the case of Ethiopia this translates into a sophisticated network of formal and informal interests from the military, private sector, civic groups, rebels, consumers, farmers, and financial institutions. These entities come together in precise and indirect ways, which many Ethiopians may not be fully cognizant.
Zenawi was an institution in and of himself, but he did not stand on his own. Just like most ‘Big Men’ regimes there are “second fiddles,” or individuals who are acting primarily behind the scenes and, because they have aggregated enough authority and followers, have become major forces in the political and economic landscape. These individuals could range from, depending on the country, career military officers, tribal leaders, leaders of insurgent and rebels groups, members of Parliament, or being a relative of another power broker. Importantly, “second fiddles” do not necessarily need to come from, in this case, Zenawi’s inner circle because of the diverse nature of informal social relations and political pragmatism (buying off some opposition) in ‘Big Men’ regimes. The individual who actually replaces Zenawi may, or may not, ascend to the role of Prime Minister. Rather, the individual would understand that it is more critical to fill the all-important void in the informal patrimonial network that Zenawi left behind – especially since these informal networks are what allow the country to function.
At the present moment, the Deputy Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn is in charge of the country, meaning that there is some element of stability in Ethiopia. Though, it will soon be clear which of the “second fiddles” in the now shifting Ethiopian power structures will by vying for more control and wealth. To be sure, the rational and self-interested political economic actions of people in the vast informal network will empower someone to be an adequate enough replacement for Meles Zenawi.
Questions of leadership succession in Africa seem to be more of a shot in the dark to outsiders, especially compared to the predictability usually associated with the legal-rational systems in the West. Political transition in Africa has a reputation of being a tournament-style moment, with various personalities all gunning for that number one slot. I am sure that Ethiopia is no exception to this. There are individuals who have sat and waited eagerly as “second fiddles” during Zenawi’s long rule for a bigger piece of the action. Commentators on African affairs would do well to observe how Ethiopia recovers from this show, and not only note who replaces Zenawi but how they ascend to that role.
Declan Galvin is an MA candidate at New York University concentrating on African Politics and Security. He is an avid observer and commentator on global issues, and was recently honored as an NYU Africa House Fellow. He has lived, worked, and conducted research throughout the African continent since 2008, presenting and publishing his findings in a number of social and academic venues. In addition to his scholarly work, he has consulted and worked with non-profit organizations throughout the world. He may be reached at dbg279@nyu.edu for questions or comments.
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